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 Sometimes, law enforcement officers violate the Fourth 
Amendment
1
 and in the process find and seize evidence they wish to 
use in a subsequent criminal prosecution. In these circumstances, a 
question that has long troubled courts, and a question that is becoming 
more and more difficult to answer, is whether such evidence should be 
admissible at trial.   
                                                 
 Juris Doctor, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Member, Moot Court Honors Society, 2013–15; B.A., Political 
Science, Eastern Michigan University, 2012. I would like to thank Professor Hal 
Morris and McKenna Prohov for their guidance and editing. I would also like to 
thank my family for their never-ending support. 
1
 The Fourth Amendment provides that: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
1
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 In Weeks v. United States,
2
 the Supreme Court established that 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was not 
admissible in federal prosecutions,
3
 and in Mapp v. Ohio,
4
 the Court 
extended the rule to state prosecutions.
5
 This rule has become known 
as the exclusionary rule.
6
 However, in a line of cases beginning with 
United States v. Leon,
7
 the Court has held, in a variety of different 
circumstances, that evidence should not be excluded if officers are 
acting in “good faith”
8
 or “objectively reasonably,”
9
 even when those 
officers’ actions violate the Fourth Amendment.   
 For example, the Court has declined to suppress evidence, even 
though the law enforcement officers’ conduct was unconstitutional, 





warrants with a good faith (but incorrect) belief that the warrants were 
valid; conducted a warrantless search of a business in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a state statute authorizing the search, even 
when the statute was subsequently declared unconstitutional;
12
 
arrested a suspect based on an objectively reasonable belief that a 
computer record, which indicated that an outstanding warrant existed 
for a suspect’s arrest, was accurate, even when that record was 
inaccurate;
13
 and arrested a suspect based on a good faith belief that an 
                                                 
2
 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
3
 Id. at 388–89. 
4
 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5
 Id. at 645–646.   
6
 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984). 
7
 Id. at 925. 
8
 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009); Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 991 (1984); Leon, 468 U.S. at 918–26.  
9
 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340, 360–61 (1987). 
10
 Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. 
11
 Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 991. 
12
Krull, 480 U.S. at 360–61 (1987). 
13
Evans, 514 U.S. at15–16 (1995). 
2
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arrest warrant existed in a neighboring county for the suspect, even 
when the record was inaccurate and the warrant had been rescinded.
14
 
 The Court’s justification for this good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule has been twofold.  First, the Court has recognized 
that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but 
instead a judicially created remedy designed to deter law enforcement 
officers from committing future Fourth Amendment violations.
15
 
Second, because of the rule’s purpose as a deterrent, the Court has 
held that it should only be applied when the benefits of applying it 
(deterring police misconduct) outweigh its costs (the suppression of 
reliable evidence of guilt, which often results in the guilty going free 
or getting reduced sentences through plea-bargaining).
16
 Put 
differently, the Court has created the good faith exception because it 
has held that punishing law enforcement by excluding evidence would 
not yield any appreciable deterrent effect when officers act in good 
faith, and because it has considered the suppression of evidence a 
“bitter pill” for society to swallow.
17
 
 The most recent case in this line of good faith exception cases 
is Davis v. United States, where the Court held that “[e]vidence 
obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding 
precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”
18
 This good faith 
exception holds true even if the binding precedent the officers rely on 
is subsequently overruled. For example, in Davis, the Court held that 
evidence found during a search of Davis’ car incident to his arrest was 
properly admitted at his trial, because at the time the search occurred 
(April 2007) the police were relying on the Court’s holding in New 
York v. Belton
19
 (decided in 1981) that such searches were 
authorized.
20
 And, Davis held that the exclusionary rule should not 
                                                 
14
 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009). 
15
 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. 
16
 Id. at 907. 
17
 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). 
18
 Id. at 2429.   
19
 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).  
20
 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423. 
3
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apply even though Belton’s holding had been subsequently limited by 
Arizona v. Gant
21
 (decided in 2009), and that under Gant the police’s 
conduct would have been unlawful.
22
  
 Because of the potential breadth of its holding, Davis is an 
incredibly important case in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and it 
has already led to a great variety of interpretations in lower courts.
23
 
To illustrate this point, it is useful to briefly examine two key 
questions posed by Davis. 
 The first question is, what exactly constitutes binding 
precedent? If one jurisdiction lacks precedent authorizing a specific 
police practice, can another jurisdiction’s precedent authorizing that 
practice be considered “binding” under Davis?
24
 Second, if there is 
binding precedent available, what are the limits of officers’ good faith 
reliance on that precedent? If the Supreme Court has said that officers 
may install a beeper in a package with the consent of the package’s 
owner in order to monitor it for a few days without committing a 
Fourth Amendment search,
25
 can officers rely in good faith on this 
case when they install a GPS monitoring device on a suspect’s car 
without his consent and use it to monitor his movements for 347 
days?
26
   
 Because these questions have been answered in very different 
ways, courts’ interpretations of Davis have led to very different 
results.
27
 This Comment focuses on the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                 
21
 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
22
 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426. 
23
 Compare United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(refusing to consider out of jurisdiction precedent as binding), with Taylor v. State, 
410 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. App. 2013) (accepting “federal precedent in the majority 
of the federal circuit courts” as binding precedent). 
24
 See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 338–89 (4th Cir. 2014); 
Martin, 712 F.3d at 1082. 
25
 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). 
26
 See United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that 
officers could have such good faith reliance). 
27
 See, e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that 
officers could rely in good faith on Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, and United States v. Karo, 
4
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interpretation of Davis in a 2014 case, United States v. Gutierrez, 
where the court held that drugs found in Gutierrez’s home were 
properly admitted into evidence at his criminal trial because the 
officers were relying in good faith on binding precedent.
28
 Consistent 
with Davis, the court in Gutierrez reached this holding even though it 
recognized that under a Supreme Court case
29
 decided after the 
officers found the drugs, the officers’ conduct was unconstitutional.  
 This Comment suggests that Seventh Circuit read Davis too 
broadly in Gutierrez, and in doing so failed to adopt the best possible 
interpretation of Davis. Part A of this Comment discusses Gutierrez in 
detail. Part B contains a brief history of the exclusionary rule. Part C 
discusses the history of the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule, including a detailed discussion of Davis. Part D discusses lower 
courts’ applications of Davis and some of the most common questions 
courts have faced when determining whether law enforcement officers 
were relying in good faith on binding precedent. Part E discusses the 
best path forward for courts when interpreting and applying Davis.  
Finally, Part F discusses how the Seventh Circuit failed to follow this 





A. United States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014) 
 
 In November 2012, law enforcement officers in Indiana 
received a confidential tip that a man named Oscar Gutierrez was 
involved in drug trafficking and resided at an address in 
                                                                                                                   
468 U.S. 705 (1984) when installing a GPS device onto a suspect’s car and using the 
device to monitor the car’s movements); State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 341, 347 (S.C. 
2014) (holding that officers could not rely in good faith on Knotts and Karo when 
installing a GPS device onto a suspect’s car and using the device to monitor the car’s 
movements). 
28
 760 F.3d 750, 759 (7th Cir. 2014). 
29
 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
5
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 Based on that tip, numerous law enforcement officers 
went to Gutierrez’s home, bringing with them a certified drug 
detection dog named Fletch.
31
 At the home, the officers knocked on 
the front door and saw movement inside, but no one answered.
32
 A 
detective named Cline then had Fletch examine Gutierrez’s front door 
for the scent of drugs, and the dog gave a positive alert.
33
   
 The officers continued to knock, but after about fifteen minutes 
of receiving no answer, they were instructed by the county prosecutor 
to enter and secure the home.
34
 So, the officers forcibly entered, 
conducted a sweep for occupants, found Gutierrez and a man named 
Cota, and then handcuffed them and brought them to the kitchen of the 
home.
35
 Sometime after the entry, Cline left and obtained a search 
warrant in which he identified the informant’s tip, the knock-and-talk 
attempt, and Fletch’s positive indication at the front door as bases for 
probable cause.
36
 When Cline returned, the officers began their search 
of Gutierrez’s home and found 11.3 pounds of methamphetamine.
37
   
 In December 2012, Gutierrez was charged with a single count 
of possession with intent to distribute over fifty grams of 
methamphetamine.
38
 In March 2013, the Supreme Court decided 
Florida v. Jardines,
39
 in which the Court held that a dog-sniff of the 
curtilage of a home is a Fourth Amendment search for which a warrant 
is ordinarily required.
40
 So, two months after Jardines was decided, 
Gutierrez filed a motion to suppress arguing that the officers were 
                                                 
30










 Id.   
36
 Id. at 752. 
37
 Id.   
38
 Id. at 753. 
39
 133 S. Ct. 1409. 
40
 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 753 (citing Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414). 
6
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required to get a warrant before having Fletch sniff his home, and that 
any evidence recovered inside his home should be suppressed.
41
    
 The district court denied his motion, holding that because at 
the time of the dog-sniff the officers were relying in good faith on 
binding judicial precedent, the exclusionary rule did not apply.
42
 
Gutierrez then entered into a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to 
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion.
43
   
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
district court.
44
 First, the court discussed the history of the 
exclusionary rule, and the Court’s recent decision in Davis.
45
 In Davis, 
which is discussed in more detail in Part C-2, the Court held that if law 
enforcement officers “conduct a search in objectively reasonable 
reliance on binding judicial precedent,” the exclusionary rule does not 
bar the admission of evidence found during that search, even if the 
judicial precedent is later held invalid.
46
 Given this rule, the Gutierrez 
court held that “the evidence in Gutierrez’s case should not be 
suppressed if binding appellate precedent authorized the officers’ 
conduct.”
47
   
 So, the court next had to review the Circuit’s relevant 
precedent, United States v. Brock,
48
 to determine whether the case was 
binding in November 2012 when Fletch sniffed Gutierrez’s front door, 
and whether or not the officers could rely in good faith on Brock to 
authorize their conduct.
49
   
 In Brock, law enforcement officers went to David Brock’s 
residence at 3375 Payton Avenue in Indianapolis and executed a 
                                                 
41




 Id.   
44
 Id. at 759.   
45
 Id. at 753–54 
46
 131 S. Ct. at 2428. 
47
 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 754. 
48
 417 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2005). 
49
 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 754–57. 
7
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 To execute the warrant, the officers conducted a full 
search of the home during which they recovered drugs and other 
contraband.
51
 Brock was not present during the search, but three 
individuals named Godsey, Knock, and Hayden were.
52
 After an 
officer put all three in handcuffs, read them their Miranda rights, and 
questioned them, Godsey told the police he lived next door at 3381 
Payton Avenue and that he watched over both houses.
53
 Godsey then 
gave the police a key to 3381, and consented to a search of the 
common areas of that residence.
54
  He also informed the police that 
Brock rented a room at 3381, and used it as a stash house to store 
drugs.
55
   
 After hearing this information, an officer (Miller) returned to 
his office to prepare an affidavit to obtain a search warrant for the 
entire 3381 residence.
56
 Other officers entered 3381 with Godsey’s 
key.
57
 Inside, one bedroom was locked and had a sign on the door 
reading “Stay Out. David.”
58
 After the police saw the door, a canine 
officer and his dog were called to 3381 to corroborate the presence of 
narcotics in the bedroom.
59
 Inside the home, the dog gave a positive 




 Officer Miller then prepared an affidavit in which he detailed 
the evidence collected from 3375, as well as the dog’s alert in front of 
Brock’s door at 3381 as bases for probable cause.
61
 Based on these 
                                                 
50
 417 F.3d at 693. 
51










 Brock, 417 F.3d at 693. 
57






 Id. at 693–94. 
61
 Id. at 694.   
8
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facts, a judge issued a search warrant authorizing a search of 3381.
62
 
When Miller returned with the warrant, the police entered Brock’s 
bedroom and discovered more drugs and other contraband.
63
 Brock 
was later charged with drug and firearm offenses.
64
 
 Prior to his trial, Brock moved to suppress the evidence found 
in 3381, but the trial court denied his motion.
65
 On appeal, Brock 
argued that the dog sniff outside his locked bedroom door was an 
illegal warrantless search, and that the warrant to search 3381 issued in 
reliance on that sniff violated the constitution.
66
 The government 
argued that the dog sniff was not a search, because the police were 
lawfully inside Brock’s home due to Godsey’s consent, and that Brock 




 Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
Brock’s motion.
68
 This was because the dog sniff at Brock’s door 
could only reveal the presence or absence of narcotics, and because 
Brock’s expectation that his possession of narcotics would remain 
private was not objectively reasonable.
69
 In reaching this holding, the 
court relied on three Supreme Court decisions,
70
 and several decisions 
of federal appellate courts,
71
 almost all of which held that dog sniffs 
used only to detect the presence or absence of contraband are not 










 Id.  
67
 Id. at 695.   
68
 Id. at 700. 
69
Id. at 696. 
70
 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
71
 See United States. v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir.1998); United States 
v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 
F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 238 (7th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
9
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searches because individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in concealing contraband.
72
   
 Also, the court noted that a “critical” aspect of its holding was 
the fact that the police were “lawfully present inside the common areas 
of the residence with the consent of Brock’s roommate.”
73
   
 In Gutierrez, Gutierrez argued that United States v. Jones,
74
 
which was decided before the police used their dog to sniff his front 
door, had overruled Brock.
75
 This was because Jones held that the 
government could commit a search by trespassing into a 
constitutionally protected area like the home or a person’s effects.
76
  
So, Gutierrez argued that the dog sniff in his case was a search 
because the police physically intruded into the curtilage of his home to 
conduct the sniff.
77
 And, because the dog-sniff was a search, the fact 
that the police lacked a warrant to conduct the sniff rendered it 
unlawful.   
 However, the court in Gutierrez held that Jones did not 
overrule Brock, despite Jones’ clear holding that the “common-law 
trespassory test”
78
 could be used to determine whether a search 
occurred.
79
 First, the court noted that the Court had previously ruled 
that dog sniffs are “sui generis,” (of their own kind) which suggested 
that doctrinal changes to Fourth Amendment principles might not 
apply to dog sniffs due to their unique nature.
80
 Second, the court 
noted that in Kentucky v. King,
81
 decided less than a year before Jones, 
the Court had held that police may, without a warrant, knock on a door 
                                                 
72
 Brock, 417 F.3d at 696–97 (citations omitted). 
73
 Id. at 697.  
74
 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
75
 United States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
76
 Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–51 (2012)). 
77
 Brief and Required Short Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 10, United 
States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1159). 
78
 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. 
79
 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 756. 
80
 Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
81
 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).   
10
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of a home, including for investigatory purposes, because in doing so 
the officers do no more than any private citizen.
82
   
 So, the court reasoned that before Jardines was decided, the 
Court had allowed police officers to use dog sniffs and to enter the 
curtilage of a home to seek information without trespassing, and that 
these two holdings were “sufficient to determine that Brock was still 
good law at the time of the search of Gutierrez’s home . . . .”
83
  
 Gutierrez also argued that the police officers did not act in 
good faith on any precedent, because the officers “acted in obvious 
disregard of established trespass principles.”
84
 However, the court 
rejected this argument because it found that the case was “exactly like 
Brock in all-important respects.”
85
 According to the court, in both 
Brock and the present case, the law enforcement officers were lawfully 
present in the areas they where in when using their dogs to sniff for 
drugs.
86
 So, the court held that “because binding appellate precedent 
permitted law enforcement’s conduct at the time it took place,” the 




B. The Exclusionary Rule 
 
 In Weeks v. United States, Weeks was convicted of using the 
mails for the purposes of transporting tickets or shares in a lottery.
88
 
However, before Weeks was ever arrested, police officers entered his 
home without a warrant and searched it, finding and seizing various 
papers that were turned over to a U.S. Marshall.
89
 Later in the same 
                                                 
82
 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 756 (citing King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862, and WAYNE 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SIEZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.3(e), 
at 592–93 (4th Ed. 2004)). 
83
 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 756. 
84
 Id. at 758.   
85
 Id.  
86
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day, the Marshall returned to Weeks’ home and again entered without 
a warrant, searched the home, and found and took more papers.
90
 
 Before his trial started, Weeks filed a petition for the return of 
his papers, on the grounds that the government had entered his home 
unlawfully.
91
 In ruling on the petition, the trial court did order the 
return of papers that did not relate to Weeks’ charges, but declined to 
order the return of the papers that were pertinent his charges that 
would be used in evidence at his trial.
92
 
 So, on appeal, the question before the Court was, what must 
trial courts do when faced with motions to exclude evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment?
93
 Ultimately, the Court 
unanimously held that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to 
limit the power and authority of federal courts and officials, and to 
“forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of 
law.”
94
 Further, the Court held that the duty of giving the Fourth 
Amendment its true force and effect was “obligatory” upon all those 
entrusted in the federal system with enforcing the law.
95
 So, the Court 
held that the unlawfully seized evidence should have been excluded 
from use at Weeks’ trial.
96
   
 In Mapp v. Ohio, Mapp was convicted of possessing lewd 
books and pictures, but her conviction was based primarily evidence 
(the lewd books and pictures) that the police seized during an unlawful 
search of her home.
97
 Ohio argued that, even if the search was 
unlawful, the evidence could be admitted because the Court had 
previously ruled that Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the 




 Id. at 387–88. 
92
 Id. at 388. 
93
 Id. at 389. 
94
 Id. at 391–92. 
95
 Id. at 392. 
96
 Id. at 388–89. 
97
 367 U.S. 643 (1961).   
12
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admission of unlawfully seized evidence in state prosecutions.
98
 
However, the Court rejected this argument and held that Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule was applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
99
 In the Court’s view, the right to have 
unlawfully obtained evidence excluded in a criminal trial was a 
“constitutional privilege,” and that individuals should not be restrained 
from enforcing this privilege in state courts.
100
   
 
C. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
 
1. Pre-Davis Case Law 
 
 In United States v. Leon, the Court for the first time carved out 
an exception to the exclusionary rule.
101
 The case arose after a 
confidential informant of “unproven reliability” told a police officer in 
Burbank, California that two persons were selling drugs from their 
residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank.
102
 Based on this information, 
the police began investigating the residence, and eventually applied for 
and obtained a facially valid warrant to search it as was well as two 
other residences and various suspects’ cars.
103
   
 However, in response to a motion to dismiss brought by Leon 
and others, the trial court held that the officer’s affidavit in support of 
the warrant application was insufficient to establish probable cause 
and therefore suppressed the evidence.
104
 The trial court did rule that 
the officers had acted in good faith, but it rejected the government’s 
position that the exclusionary rule should not apply when evidence is 
seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant.
105
 But, 
                                                 
98
 Id. at 645–646 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)). 
99




 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
102
 Id. at 901.   
103
 Id. at 901–02. 
104
 Id. at 903. 
105
 Id. at 903–04. 
13
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the Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule should be 
modified so as not to require the suppression of evidence when 
officers act in “good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is 
subsequently held to be defective.”
106
 According to the Court, this 
modification was appropriate for three basic reasons. 
 First, the Court held that because the Fourth Amendment 
contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of its commands, the use of unlawfully seized 
evidence at trial does not constitute a new Fourth Amendment 
violation.
107
 So, because of this, the exclusionary rule only operated as 
a “judicially created remedy” designed to protect Fourth Amendment 
rights through its deterrent effect and was not a “personal 
constitutional right.”
108
 This holding notably moved away from the 
Court’s previous position in Mapp that the ability to have 




 Second, because the exclusionary rule was not a personal 
constitutional right, the Court held that the question of whether to 
apply it must be a separate inquiry from whether the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the person seeking to invoke the rule were 
violated by the government.
110
 Stated differently, the fact that there 
should be two independent inquiries meant that a Fourth Amendment 
violation did not automatically trigger application of the exclusionary 
and the suppression of evidence found during the violation.   
 Third, the Court held that deciding when to apply the 
exclusionary rule must be resolved by “weighing the costs and 
benefits” of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of 
“inherently trustworthy tangible evidence . . . .”
111
 On the cost side of 
this equation, the Court recognized that exclusion was “substantial,” 
                                                 
106
 Id. at 905. 
107
 Id. at 906. 
108
 Id.  
109
 367 U.S. at 655. 
110
 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. 
111
 Id. at 906–07. 
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because it would unacceptably impede the truth-finding functions of 
the judge and jury.
112
 And, as a collateral consequence of this 
interference, some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced 
sentences after plea-bargaining.
113
 So, on the benefit side of the 
equation, the Court held that the rule should be restricted to situations 
in which its remedial deterrent objectives were “most efficaciously 
served.”
114
 Therefore, because the officers believed in good faith that 
their warrant was valid, the Court held that suppressing the evidence 
found in reliance on the warrant would not serve any deterrent purpose 
and the exclusionary rule should not apply.
115
 
 After Leon, the Court decided a string of cases extending this 
good faith exception in a number of different circumstances. In 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Court extended Leon to hold that, even 
though a search warrant was facially invalid, items found during 
execution of the warrant should not be suppressed because the officers 
acted in good faith on the warrant.
116
  
 In Illinois v. Krull, an Illinois statute, in order to regulate the 
sale of cars, authorized state officials to inspect the premises of 
business that sold cars or car parts.
117
 Pursuant to the statute, a 
detective of the Chicago police department went to an auto-wrecking 
yard to investigate the yard’s license and any potential stolen 
vehicles.
118
 During his investigation, the detective discovered that 
three of the cars at the lot were stolen.
119
   
 In the trial court, the respondents moved to suppress the 
evidence seized from the yard, because a federal court had held (one 
day after the detectives’ search) that the statute was unconstitutional 






 Id. at 907.   
115
 Id. at 918–926. 
116
 468 U.S. 981, 991 (1984).   
117
 480 U.S. 340, 342–43 (1987). 
118
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due to the fact it authorized warrantless searches.
120
 However, the 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that because the 
detective was acting in “objectively reasonable reliance” on the statute 
that authorized the search, the evidence should not be suppressed.
121
   
 In Arizona v. Evans, a police officer saw Evans driving the 
wrong way on a one-way street in front of a police station.
122
 After 
stopping Evans and entering Evans’ name into a computer in the 
officer’s patrol car, the computer indicated that there was an 
outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest.
123
 During Evans’ 
subsequent arrest, he dropped a marijuana cigarette that led to the 
police searching his car and finding a bag of marijuana.
124
 
 In his subsequent criminal proceeding for possession of 
marijuana, Evans argued that the drugs should be suppressed because 
his arrest warrant had been quashed seventeen days before his arrest, 
making the arrest unlawful.
125
 The trial court agreed and granted 
Evans’ motion because it concluded that, “the State had been at fault 
for failing to quash the warrant.”
126
 But, the Supreme Court reversed, 
and held that because the officer was acting “objectively reasonably” 
on the computer record, it did not matter that the record was inaccurate 
and the exclusionary rule did not apply.
127
   
 The Court’s most recent good faith case, prior to Davis, was 
Herring v. United States.
128
 In Herring, a police officer learned that 
Herring had driven to a county sheriff’s department to pick something 
                                                 
120
 Id. at 344 (citing Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 
582 (N.D. Ill. 1981)). 
121
 Krull, 480 U.S. at 360–61. 
122








 Id. at 5. 
127
 Id. at 15–16. 
128
 555 U.S. 135 (2009).   
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up from his impounded truck.
129
 In response to this, the officer asked 
the county’s warrant clerk (Pope) to check to see if Herring had any 
outstanding warrants for his arrest.
130
 When Pope found no warrants, 
the officer asked her to check with the clerk of a neighboring county 
(Morgan), and Morgan reported that there was an active arrest 
warrant.
131
 So, the officer and a deputy followed Herring as he left the 
impound, pulled him over, and arrested him.
132
 During a search 
incident to the arrest, the police found drugs on Herring’s person and a 
pistol in his car.
133
   
 However, there had been a mistake about the existence of the 
warrant.
134
 Morgan’s computer records indicated that there was an 
arrest warrant, but when she went to retrieve the physical copy in 
order to fax it to the officer, she could not find it.
135
 Morgan then 
called a court clerk and “learned that the warrant had been recalled 
five months earlier.”
136
 Morgan called Pope to alert her of the mistake, 




 After Herring was indicted, he moved to suppress the evidence 
based on the unlawful warrantless arrest.
138
 However, the trial court 
denied the motion because the officers had “acted in a good-faith 
belief that the warrant was still outstanding.”
139
 The Court affirmed, 
holding that because at the very worst the officer’s actions were 
negligent, the exclusionary rule should not apply.
140
 The Court held 
                                                 
129










 Herring, 555 U.S. at 137. 
135
 Id. at 137–38. 
136




 Id.   
139
 Id.   
140
 Id. at 147–48. 
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that applying the rule would only yield “marginal deterrence,” and that 





2. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) 
 
 Davis is the latest case in the Supreme Court’s good faith 
jurisprudence.  Although the concepts the Court used to reach its 
holding are familiar, the case has the potential to dramatically change 
the way the exclusionary rule is applied, and it has already changed 
the way some courts approach individuals’ motions to suppress 
evidence brought on Fourth Amendment grounds.
142
   
 In Davis, police officers in Greeneville, Alabama conducted a 
routine stop of a car in which Davis was a passenger in April 2007.
143
 
The stop ultimately led to Davis’ arrest, and he was placed in the back 
of a patrol car.
144
 The police then searched the car and found a 
revolver in Davis’ jacket, and Davis was subsequently indicted for 
being a felon in possession of a firearm.
145
 To better understand the 
procedural posture of the case, and to better understand the Court’s 
overall holding, it is useful (as Justice Alito did in the majority 
opinion) to briefly describe the history of the Court’s search incident 
to arrest cases.   
 In Chimel v. California, the Court held that a police officer that 
makes a lawful arrest may conduct a warrantless search of the 
arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control.
146
 In the 
years directly after Chimel, its rule became difficult to apply, 
                                                 
141
 Id.   
142
 See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 62 (2013) (declining to 
address whether or not the government’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment 
and instead focusing only on whether the officers were acting in good faith and 
whether the exclusionary rule should apply). 
143




 Id. at 2425–26. 
146
 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
188 
“particularly in cases that involved searches inside of automobiles 
after the arrestees were no longer in them.”
147
 
 Some courts “upheld the constitutionality of vehicle searches 
that were substantially contemporaneous with occupants’ arrests,”
148
 
while others “disapproved of automobile searches incident to arrests, 
at least absent some continuing threat that the arrestee might gain 
access to the vehicle and destroy evidence or grab a weapon.”
149
 In 
1981, the Court granted certiorari in New York v. Belton
150




 In Belton, a police officer pulled over a car in which Belton 
and three other men were traveling.
152
 After suspecting the passengers 
of possessing marijuana, he ordered all of them out of the car and 
arrested them.
153
 The officer then split them up into four different 
areas of a “[t]hruway,” and subsequently searched the passenger 
compartment of the car.
154
 Inside, he found a jacket belonging to 
Belton that contained cocaine.
155
 Ultimately, the Court ruled that the 
search was lawful, and held that “when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.”
156
 
 Many courts understood Belton to have announced a bright line 
rule that authorized searches of cars incident to arrests of occupants 
regardless of whether the arrestee was within reaching distance of the 
                                                 
147
 Davis v United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) (citing New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458–59 (1981)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
148
 Id. at 2424 n.1 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
149
 Id. at 2424 n.2 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150
 453 U.S. 454. 
151
 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424 (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 459–60).   
152
 453 U.S. at 455.   
153




 Id.   
156
 Id. at 460.   
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car during the search.
157
 This was true even when the arrestee had 
exited the vehicle and been taken into custody by the police.
158
  
 However, as Davis recognized, not every Court agreed with 
this interpretation of Belton.
159
 For example, in State v. Gant, the 
Arizona Supreme Court held that where no exigency existed 
endangering the safety of the arresting officer or officers, Belton did 
not apply and a search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
would be unlawful.
160
 On appeal, the Court in Arizona v. Gant 
(decided in 2009) affirmed and held that the Belton rule only applied 
where “the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”
161
 The end result of 
Gant is that an automobile search incident to an occupant’s arrest is 
now constitutional only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of 
the car during the search, or if the police have reason to believe that 
there is “evidence relevant to the crime of arrest” in the vehicle.
162
  
 Davis was indicted in the Middle District of Alabama and later 
convicted.
163
 While his appeal was pending, the Court decided 
Gant.
164
 The Eleventh Circuit then applied Gant’s new rule to Davis’ 
case, and held that the search of the vehicle he was in was unlawful. 
But, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless declined to suppress the 
evidence,
165
 because the court concluded that penalizing the arresting 
officer for following what at the time was binding precedent (Belton) 
would not deter future Fourth Amendment violations.
166
   
                                                 
157
 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) (citing Thornton v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004)). 
158
 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424 n.3.   
159
 Id. at 2425. 
160
 Id. (citing State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 643 (Ariz. 2007)). 
161
 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 
(2009)).   
162
 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).   
163






 Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1263, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 
2010)). 
20
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 So, on appeal in the Supreme Court, the question was “whether 
to apply the exclusionary rule when the police conduct a search in 
objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent.”
167
 In 
the end, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply for 
three reasons.  
 First, the Court noted that Davis had conceded that at the time 
of the search, the officers were strictly complying with binding 
Eleventh Circuit precedent that authorized the search.
168
 So, from the 
very start, the Court held that this concession doomed Davis’ 
argument. This was because, second, the Court recognized that in 
twenty-seven years of jurisprudence since the good-faith exception 
was first created in Leon, the Court had “never applied” the 
exclusionary rule to “suppress evidence obtained as a result of 
nonculpable, innocent police conduct.”
169
 Finally, because the police 
officers were in no way culpable of any wrongdoing, the Court held 
that the only thing excluding the evidence would deter would be 
“conscientious police work.”
170
 As the Court noted, “when binding 
appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice, 
well-trained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-
detection and public-safety responsibilities.”
171
 So, consistent with the 
its long standing cost-benefit analysis, the Court declined to exclude 
the evidence and held that “when the police conduct a search in 
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply.”
172
  
 Justice Sotomayor wrote a very important concurring opinion. 
In the opinion, she agreed with the majority that because the primary 
purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct, the 
rule should not apply when binding precedent specifically authorizes a 
particular police practice, and that the authorization was “in accord 
                                                 
167








 Id.  
172
 Id. at 2434.   
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with the holdings of nearly every other court in the country.”
173
 
However, she suggested that if the underlying law regarding the 
constitutionality of a law enforcement practice was “unsettled,” a 
different result may be warranted and the exclusionary rule may 
apply.
174
 This was because, in these circumstances, exclusion might 






D. Lower Courts’ Applications of Davis 
 
 Courts applying Davis’ good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule have faced two interpretive challenges. The first has 
been to determine what constitutes binding precedent. The second has 
been determining the limits of officers’ reliance on that precedent if 
any of relevance can be found. As one court has phrased the issue: 
“[t]he scope of [the] reasonable-reliance-on-precedent test turns on 
two subsidiary questions: what universe of cases can the police rely 
on? And how clearly must those cases govern the current case for that 
reliance to be objectively reasonable?”
176
 
 Due to the complexity of these challenges, lower courts have 
applied Davis in a variety of different ways, leading to very different 
and inconsistent results.  
 
1. What Constitutes Binding Precedent? 
 
 One of the key questions that have divided courts when 
interpreting Davis has been whether decisions from other jurisdictions 
qualify as binding precedent. For example, some courts have held that 
only decisions from that court or the United States Supreme Court 
                                                 
173
 Id. at 2434–45. 
174
 Id.  
175
 Id. at 2436. 
176
 United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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 while other courts have held that 
officers may rely on precedent from outside the reviewing court’s 
jurisdiction.
178
 More commonly, courts have suggested, without 




                                                 
177
 See, e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In the 
context of statutory interpretation, ‘binding precedent’ refers to the precedent of this 
Circuit and the Supreme Court.”); United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (rejecting the government’s argument that the police should be able to 
rely in good faith on “the weight of authority around the country”); State v. Mitchell, 
323 P.3d 69, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting the government’s argument that 
officers could rely on the decisions of federal circuit courts); Parker v. 
Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Ky. 2014) (defining binding precedent as 
“clearly established precedent from this Court or the United States Supreme Court”); 
Kelly v. State, 82 A.3d 205, 215 (Md. 2013) (“[O]peration of the exclusionary rule is 
suspended only when the evidence seized was the result of a search that, when 
conducted, was a ‘police practice’ specifically authorized by the jurisdiction’s 
precedent in which the officer operates.”); State v. Allen, 997 N.E.2d 621, 626–27 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (focusing solely on “binding appellate precedent in Ohio”). 
178
 United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 338 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
officers could rely on the “general legal landscape” and a decision of the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland to authorize their conduct); Taylor v. State, 410 
S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. App. 2013) (holding that the good faith exception should 
apply because the officers “acted in reasonable reliance on federal precedent in the 
majority of the federal circuit courts of appeal”). 
179
 United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that 
Davis’ emphasis on the absence of police culpability could be read to imply that 
officers could rely in good-faith on out of circuit precedent, but declining to 
expressly decide the issue); United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 
2014) (holding that officers were acting in good faith because at the time of their 
conduct, the Sixth Circuit and three other circuits had held that similar conduct was 
permissible); United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014) (strongly 
suggesting that officers may rely on decisions from other federal circuits because not 
allowing police to do so would not yield much deterrence); People v. LeFlore, 996 
N.E.2d 678, 692 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013) (examining whether any decisions of the 
Seventh Circuit authorized the police’s conduct); State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 341, 
346–47 (S.C. 2014) (looking for federal decisions that the officers could have relied 
upon, but finding none). See also United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 177–82 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding that, even if Davis’ binding precedent exception did 
not apply, the officers were still acting in good faith because their conduct 
23
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 Another question has been, when an investigation takes place 
in several different states or jurisdictions, must officers comply with 
each jurisdiction’s precedents in order to be acting in good faith?
180
 
For example, in United States v. Barraza-Maldanado, DEA agents 
attached a GPS monitoring device onto a car in Phoenix.
181
 Four 
weeks later, Barraza-Maldonado borrowed the car from its registered 
owner, and agents monitored the car as he drove it from Phoenix to 
Minneapolis.
182
 When the car entered Minnesota, the agents told state 
law enforcement officers that the car was suspected of transporting 
drugs, and advised officers of the car’s location.
183
 After a state 
trooper conducted a traffic stop and found drugs inside the vehicle, 
Barraza-Maldandao was subsequently tried in federal court in 
Minnesota, which is under the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction.
184
   
 One day after Barraza-Maldonado’s arrest, the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Jones, and held that the use of a GPS device 
to monitor a car’s movements was a search for which a warrant would 
ordinarily be required.
185
 So, on appeal, the question before the Eighth 
Circuit was whether the agents acted in good faith on any binding 
precedent when they installed the device.
186
 
 The court began its analysis by holding that “[f]or the good 
faith exception to apply, officers performing a particular investigatory 
action—such as GPS tracking—must strictly comply with binding 
appellate precedent governing the jurisdiction in which they are 
acting.”
187
 So, because the DEA agents had installed the device in 
                                                                                                                   
comported with the “general legal landscape” around the country, including out of 
circuit decisions). 
180
 See, e.g., United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013); Martin, 712 F.3d at 
1082. 
181
 Barraza-Maldonando, 732 F.3d at 866. 
182
 Id. at 866. 
183
 Id.  
184
 Id. at 866–67. 
185
 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 935, 954 (2012). 
186
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Phoenix, which was under the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, and 
because Ninth Circuit precedent at the time of the installation 
authorized the agents’ conduct,
188
 the court held that the good faith 
exception did apply and the drugs were admissible.
189
  
 Barraza-Maldonado argued that the agents could not have 
acted in good faith, because Minnesota state law required “court 
approval before law enforcement officers may use a mobile tracking 
device.”
190
 However, the court rejected this argument, and instead 




 A related case is United States v. Andres.
192
  In Andres, DEA 
agents in Laredo, Texas installed a GPS monitoring device on a truck 
belonging to suspected drug traffickers without a warrant.
193
 After 
learning that the car would be traveling to Chicago, the agents 
continued to monitor it with the GPS device as it left Texas.
194
 Once it 
became clear through the agents’ monitoring that the car was in fact 
heading to Chicago, the agents contacted the Illinois State Police, and 
a state trooper then conducted a traffic stop of the truck in Illinois and 
found drugs.
195
 On appeal, the court held that agents did rely in good 
faith on binding Fifth Circuit precedent
196
 when installing the device, 
but the court never analyzed whether the agents’ installation of the 
device and monitoring of the car must have also comported with the 
precedent of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit, or any other jurisdictions the 
car traveled through on its way from Texas to Illinois.
197
     
                                                 
188
 See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010). 
189
 Barraza-Maldonando, 732 F.3d at 869.   
190
 Id. at 868.   
191
 Id. at 868-69.   
192
 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 2013). 
193




 Id. at 830–31. 
196
 See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981). 
197
 See Andres, 703 F.3d at 834–35. 
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 Similarly, in United States v. Martin, Iowa police officers 
attached a GPS device to Martin’s Car in Iowa, and then tracked 
Martin as he drove the car to Illinois.
198
 Once in Illinois, a local sheriff 
stopped him and found a gun under the car’s hood.
199
 In Martin’s 
subsequent prosecution in the Seventh Circuit, the court only looked to 
see whether there was any precedent authorizing the officers’ use of 
the GPS device in the Eighth Circuit (which has jurisdiction over 
Iowa) and not the Seventh Circuit.
200
   
 Finally, another question faced by courts when deciding what 
constitutes binding precedent has arisen from the fact that often, 
federal and state law enforcement officers work together to investigate 
crime. For example, in Gutierrez, both DEA agents and Indianapolis 
police detectives went to Gutierrez’s house to investigate drug 
trafficking.
201
 So, in these circumstances, it is unclear whether 
different rules apply to each set of officers.
202
  
 May federal officers rely on both federal and state decisions to 
authorize their conduct, or must they only rely on federal decisions?
203
 
Conversely, if federal officers may look to state law, can that state law 
limit the bounds of the officers’ good-faith reliance on federal law? 
Here, decisions like Barraza-Maldonado and others suggest the 
answer is no.
204
 May state officers rely on both federal and state 
                                                 
198




 Id. at 1081–82. 
201
 760 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2014). 
202
 Oral Argument, United States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Case No. 14-1159), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/ab.14-1159.14-
1159_06_02_2014.mp3 (last visited Jan. 15th, 2015). 
203
 United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that 
Davis’ emphasis on the absence of police culpability could be read to imply that 
officers could rely in good-faith on out of circuit precedent, but declining to 
expressly decide the issue); United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 338 (4th Cir. 
2014) (holding that officers could rely on the “general legal landscape” and a 
decision of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to authorize their conduct).  
204
 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th 
Cir. 2013). 
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decisions to authorize their conduct,
205
 or must they only rely on state 
decisions?
206
 Conversely, can federal law limit the bounds of state 
officers’ reliance on state law?
207
 These questions have all been 
difficult, and led to different answers by courts.  
 
2. What are the Limits of Officers’ Good Faith Reliance on Binding 
Precedent? 
 
 In Davis, the Court summarized the law that has developed 
since Leon regarding when a law enforcement officer’s conduct will 
be sufficiently culpable to warrant application of the exclusionary rule:  
 
The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the 
deterrence benefits of exclusion vary with the 
culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue. 
When the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the 
deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to 
outweigh the resulting costs. But when the police act 
with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that 
their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves 
only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence 





In terms of applying this standard in the realm of Davis’ binding 
precedent exception, courts have faced a complicated task. Essentially, 
courts have had to compare an old case (or cases) with the present one 
under review in order to evaluate whether the officers’ reliance on the 
                                                 
205
 See State v. Mitchell, 323 P.3d 69, 77–78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). 
206
 Taylor v. State, 410 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App. 2013); People v. LeFlore, 996 
N.E.2d 678, 693 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013). 
207
 See generally Smallwood v. State, 113 So.3d 724, 739 (Fla. 2013) 
(suggesting the answer is yes). 
208
 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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old case was in good faith, or whether the officers’ actions were 
culpable enough to warrant application of the exclusionary rule.   
 This task is has been a significant undertaking, and several 
difficult questions have arisen. The first is, how similar must the 
binding precedent be to the present case under review? Or, as Davis 
suggested the inquiry should be, whether or not the precedent 
“specifically authorizes” the officers’ current conduct?
209
 More 
importantly, if the precedent that officers rely on does not actually 
authorize their conduct when it is performed, and the officers 
mistakenly rely on that precedent, can they still be held to be acting in 
good faith?
210
 Second, even if one piece of precedent does specifically 
authorize the officers’ conduct, do other cases reaching different 
results suggest that the constitutionality of the practice is an unsettled 
question thus prohibiting officers from relying on the precedent?
211
 
Third, what is the relevance of officers seeking advice on the law from 
prosecutors or other government attorneys? If an officer receives 
advice from a prosecutor that his conduct will be lawful if performed, 
is this a factor to be used in considering whether the officer acted in 
good faith on binding precedent?
212
 Fourth, what significance should 
be given to the fact that, at the time the officers carry out their 
conduct, a challenge to the constitutionality of similar conduct is 
currently pending in a court of review? Is this a proper factor for 
courts to consider in their analyses, and will this fact bar officers from 
relying in good faith on the old case authorizing a police practice?
213
   
 
                                                 
 
209
 Id. at 2429. 
 
210
 See United States v. Davis (“Davis DNA”), 690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012). 
211
 Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419 at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
212
 See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014). 
213
 See United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 
2013). 
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i. How Similar Must the Binding Precedent be to the Present Case 
Under Review? 
 
 Two police practices have been responsible for many decisions 
in which courts have applied Davis’ good faith exception. The first has 
been when law enforcement officers use GPS devices to track 
suspects’ cars, and the second has been when officers search suspects’ 
cars incident to an arrest. Because each situation has arisen so often 
after Davis, the relevant background precedent is discussed below 
before analyzing the cases that have applied Davis’ holding in each 
context.  
 
a. The GPS Cases 
 
 The Supreme Court made no ruling on whether the 
government’s placement of a GPS device on a car to monitor a 
suspect’s movements was Fourth Amendment search until it decided 
United States v. Jones in 2012.
214
 However, before discussing Jones, it 
is useful to discuss two other relevant cases that preceded that 
decision: United States v. Knotts
215
 and United States v. Karo.
216
  
 In Knotts, law enforcement officers placed a beeper in a five-
gallon drum of chloroform with the consent of the drum’s owner (the 
Hawkins Chemical Company).
217
 When Hawkins then sold the drum 
to a man named Armstrong, officers used the beeper to track the 
movements of a car (in which the drum had been placed) as the car 
traveled along public streets.
218
 Eventually, officers used the device to 
track the drum to an area outside a cabin belonging to Knotts, where 
the officers later found drugs.
219
 The Court ultimately held that this 
monitoring was not a Fourth Amendment search because the 
                                                 
214
 132. S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
215
 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
216
 468 U.S. 705 (1984).   
217






Walsman: Katz and Dogs: The Best Path Forward in Applying <em>United State
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
199 
government’s monitoring of the beeper signals did not invade any 
legitimate expectation of privacy that Knotts held.
220
 According to the 
Court, Knotts would have no expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one place to another while traveling in a car on public roads.
221
   
 In Karo, the DEA learned that Karo and two others were 
planning on buying fifty gallons of ether from a government 
informant.
222
 According to the informant, the ether was going to be 
used to extract cocaine from clothing that had been shipped into the 
United States.
223
 So, the government obtained a court order 
authorizing them to install and monitor a beeper in a can of ether that 
was to be sold the group.
224
 After installing a beeper into a can of ether 
that the DEA owned, the DEA then gave the can to the informant, and 
agents then subsequently saw Karo receive the can from the 
informant.
225
 Over the next several months, the government followed 
the can as it was moved from one place to another, eventually being 
placed inside a home in Tao, New Mexico.
226
 The agents had used the 
beeper to determine that the can was inside the house.
227
 After 
suspecting that the ether was being used in the home, the agents 
obtained a warrant to search the Taos residence, based in part on the 
information they learned from using the beeper.
228
 When the warrant 
was executed, cocaine was found.
229
 
 After Knotts challenged the use of the beeper in his criminal 
case, the question before the Court on appeal was, “whether a warrant 
                                                 
220
 Id. at 285. 
221
 Id. at 281.   
222
 468 U.S. at 708. 
223






 Id. at 708–10. 
227
 Id. at 710.   
228
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was required to authorize either the installation of the beeper or its 
subsequent monitoring.”
230
   
 In terms of the installation, the Court held that no Fourth 
Amendment search or seizure occurred.
231
 No search occurred because 
the can into which the beeper was placed belonged (at the time) to the 
DEA, and no seizure occurred because the placement of the beeper 
into the can did not interfere with anyone’s possessory interest in the 
can in a meaningful way.
232
 However, in terms of the monitoring, the 
Court held that a search had occurred.
233
 This was because the agents 
had used the beeper to monitor the can while it was inside a private 
residence, and this violated a justifiable expectation of privacy in that 
residence.
234
   
 In Jones, law enforcement officers began investigating Jones 
after suspecting him of drug trafficking.
235
 Based on their initial 
investigation, the government applied for a warrant authorizing the use 
of a GPS tracking device on a Jeep registered to Jones’ wife.
236
 A 
warrant was issued requiring the device to be installed within ten days 
in the District of Columbia, but the officers did not install the device 
until the 11th day, and they installed it in Maryland.
237
 The agents then 
used the device to monitor the Jeep’s movements for twenty-eight 
days.
238
 Ultimately, the Court held that the government’s installation 
of the GPS device on a Jones’ vehicle, and its use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements, did constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search because the government “physically occupied private property 
for the purpose of obtaining information.”
239
  
                                                 
230
 Id. at 711.   
231
 Id.   
232
 Id. at 711–13. 
233
 Id. at 714. 
234
 Id. at 714–15. 
235








 Id. at 949. 
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 The government argued that, based on the Court’s landmark 
decision in Katz v. United States,
240
 no search had occurred.
241
 In Katz, 
the Court held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the 
government violates an expectation of privacy that society is prepared 
to consider reasonable.
242
 So, the government argued there was no 
search because, given Knotts, and Karo, Jones had no expectation of 
privacy in the underbody of jeep that the agents accessed in placing 
the device, or in the locations of the Jeep as it traveled on public 
roads.
243
   
 But, the Court disagreed, and held that Jones’ Fourth 
Amendment rights did not “rise or fall” based on the test articulated in 
Katz.
244
 In other words, the Court held that “the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test.”
245
 So, because the government had 
committed a trespass by attaching the device onto the undercarriage of 
Jones’s wife’s jeep, the Court held that a search had occurred within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
246
 It is also important to note 
that before Jones, lower courts were split on whether the government’s 




                                                 
240
 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
241
 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950.   
242
 389 U.S. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
became the test adopted by the Court in many future cases. See, e.g., Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 739 (1979). But see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (criticizing 
the test). 
243
 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52. 
244
 Id. at 950.   
245
 Id. at 952.  
246
 Id. at 949. 
247
 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–98 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the government’s GPS monitoring of a vehicle’s public movements 
was not a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 
1212, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 
32
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 Given this background, virtually all of the cases discussed 
below follow a similar fact pattern: law enforcement officers place a 
GPS device on a suspect’s car without a warrant before the Court’s 
decision in Jones (January 2012), and then courts of review are asked 
to determine after Jones was decided whether the officers could rely in 
good faith on any binding precedent that using the GPS devices did 




 One common question in these cases has been whether law 
enforcement officers could rely in good faith on Knotts and Karo 
when both installing GPS devices on suspects’ cars, and using the 
devices to monitor those cars’ movements.
249
 Among these decisions, 
courts are split, with some courts answering that the officers could rely 
in good faith on Knotts and Karo to authorize both GPS installation 
and monitoring,
250
 and other courts answering that officers could not 
                                                                                                                   
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that government’s GPS monitoring of a vehicle’s 
movements was a Fourth Amendment search).  
248
 See United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Sparks, 711 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 
2013); United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Stephens, 764 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Brown, 744 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 
865 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2014); State v. 
Mitchell, 323 P.3d 69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); People v. LeFlore, 996 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2013); Kelly v. State, 82 A.3d 205 (Md. 2013); State v. Adams, 763 S.E.2d 
341 (S.C. 2014); Taylor v. State, 410 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App. 2013); State v. Oberst, 
847 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). 
249
 Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 256–57; United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 206–07 
(3d Cir. 2013) (rev’d en banc, 769 F.3d 163); Katzin, 769 F.3d 163; Stephens, 764 
F.3d at 332–34; Mitchell, 323 P.3d at 76–78; LeFlore, 996 N.E.2d at 692; Adams, 
763 S.E.2d at 347. 
250
 Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261–62; Katzin, 769 F.3d at 173–74; Stephens, 764 
F.3d at 337–38.  These cases’ holdings are interesting, given the fact that the Court 
itself in Jones held that Knotts and Karo did not authorize the law enforcement 
officers’ conduct.  See 132 S. Ct. at 951–52. 
33
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have such good faith reliance.
251
 Another court has held that officers 
could rely on Knotts and Karo when using a GPS device to monitor a 
suspect’s car, but did not have to reach the question of installation of 
the device because it had been done without a trespass.
252
 Other courts 
have held that officers could rely in good faith on Knotts or Karo 
when using GPS devices to monitor suspects’ cars, but have relied on 
other authority as providing the source of officers’ good faith reliance 
when installing the devices.
253
 Some courts, despite the obvious fact 
that Knotts and Karo will always qualify as binding precedent because 
they are Supreme Court cases, have failed to discuss their significance 
entirely, although this is likely because there were other binding 
decisions that were more on point.
254
 However, in one case, a court did 
discuss the relevance of Knotts (without discussing Karo), when other 
more on point Circuit precedent authorized the officers’ conduct.
255
 
Finally, one court has expressly declined to decide the issue of 
whether the officers could have relied in good faith on Knotts and 




 So, on the question of whether officers could rely in good faith 
on Knotts and Karo when installing GPS devices and using the devices 
to monitor suspects’ cars, courts are very split.    
  
                                                 
251
 Mitchell, 323 P.3d at 78; LeFlore, 996 N.E.2d at 692; Adams, 763 S.E.2d at 
347; Katzin, 732 F.3d at 206. 
252
 Brown, 744 F.3d at 478. 
253
 Baez, 744 F.3d at 35; Sparks, 711 F.3d at 65. 
254
 Andres, 703 F.3d at 834–35; United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 
865, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2013). 
255
 United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 914, 922–23 (11th Cir. 2014). 
256
 United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200, 204 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Some appellate 
courts have [held] that Knotts and Karo actually authorized the warrantless use of 
GPS devices and therefore are themselves a basis for asserting the good-faith 
exception . . . . We need not go that far here because at the time of the search the 
Sixth Circuit had already approved the police conduct.”). 
34
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b. Cases Involving Searches of Cars Incident to Arrest 
 
 In terms of searches of cars incident to arrest, the Court in New 
York v. Belton held that “when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.”
257
 Many courts understood Belton to 
have announced a bright line rule authorizing searches of cars incident 
to arrests of recent occupants regardless of whether the arrestee was 
within reaching distance of the car during the search.
258
 This was true 
even when the arrestee had exited the vehicle and been taken into 
custody by the police.
259
 However, in Arizona v. Gant (decided in 
April 2009), the Court changed course and held that the Belton rule 
only applied where “the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”
260
 
The end result of Gant is that a search of a car incident to an 
occupant’s arrest is now constitutional only if the arrestee is within 
reaching distance of the car during the search, or if the police have 




 Again, like the GPS cases, all cases interpreting Davis in this 
context follow a similar fact pattern: law enforcement officers conduct 
a search of a car incident to an arrest in violation of Gant’s holding but 
before Gant was decided, and then courts of review have had to 
determine after Gant whether the officers could have relied in good 
faith on any binding precedent (usually Belton or lower decisions 
applying Belton) that their conduct was permissible under the Fourth 
                                                 
257
 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981).   
258
 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (citing Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004)). 
259
 Id. at 2424 n.3.   
260
 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).   
261
 Id. at 332–33.   
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 However, unlike the GPS cases, the courts in this 
context have uniformly held that the officers were acting in good faith, 
due to the fact that Belton, or lower courts’ applications have Belton, 
established a bright-line rule that such searches were constitutionally 
permissible.
263
   
 So, in terms of how similar precedent must be to the case at 
hand for officers to rely on the precedent in good faith, the search 
incident to arrest cases have been more uniformly decided than the 
GPS cases, because of the presence of the bright-line rule that existed 
before Gant.  However, there was no such bright line rule concerning 
officers’ installation and use of GPS monitoring devices. So, in the 
GPS cases, this absence of any underlying bright line rule has led to 
far more varied results. 
 In the cases applying Davis’ discussed above, the common 
question has been whether the binding precedent law enforcement 
relied on actually authorized the police’s conduct when it was being 
performed.
264
 This focus is in line with the Davis opinion, where the 
Court held that “when binding appellate precedent specifically 
authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers will and 




 However, some courts have turned away from Davis’ 
suggestion that binding precedent must actually authorize law 
enforcement’s conduct for officers to be able to reasonably rely on that 
                                                 
262
 United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Madden, 682 F.3d 920 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Soza, 643 F.3d 1289 (10th 
Cir. 2011); Parker v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. 2014); Briscoe v. 
State, 30 A.3d 870, 873 (Md. 2011); People v. Mungo, 813 N.W.2d 796, 797 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2012); State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Mo. 2011); Narciso v. State, 
723 S.E.2d 369, 372 (S.C. 2012). 
263
 Baker, 719 F.3d at 320; Madden, 682 F.3d at 927; Soza, 643 F.3d at 1291; 
Parker, 440 S.W.3d at 385; Briscoe, 30 A.3d at 873; Mungo, 813 N.W.2d at 797; 
Johnson, 354 S.W.3d at 630; Narciso, 723 S.E.2d at 372. See also People v. Hopper, 
284 P.3d 87, 90 (Colo. App. 2011) (Hopper conceded that the search of his car was 
proper under then binding precedent).   
264
 See, e.g., United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2014). 
265
 131 S. Ct. at 2429. 
36
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 In Katzin, the court construed the “specifically 
authorizes” language in Davis (for the sake of argument only) to mean 
that, “the relied-upon case must affirmatively authorize the precise 
conduct at issue in the case under consideration.”
267
 But, the court 
went on to hold: 
 
While reliance is likely reasonable when the precise 
conduct under consideration has been affirmatively 
authorized by binding appellate precedent, it may be no 
less reasonable when the conduct under consideration 
clearly falls well within rationale espoused in binding 





In other words, Katzin held that, even where precedent does not 
actually authorize the police’s conduct, and only authorizes conduct 
that is similar to that authorized in a past case, officers may still 
reasonably rely on that precedent.
269
  
 Another court has gone ever further, and held that even if 
officers are mistaken about the law and the precedent they rely on does 
not authorize their conduct, Davis’ good faith exception can still 
apply.
270
   
 In United States v. Davis (“Davis DNA”), law enforcement 
extracted DNA from clothing that had been seized from Davis after he 
went to a hospital with a gunshot wound and claimed to be a victim of 
a robbery.
271
 Under the court’s binding precedent,
272
 if Davis had been 
a victim he would have had an expectation of privacy in his DNA, thus 
                                                 
266
 United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Davis 
(“Davis DNA”), 690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012). 
267






 Davis DNA, 690 F.3d at 230. 
271
 Id. at 230–31. 
272
 Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).   
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making the police’s later extraction of his DNA from his clothing 
unlawful.
273
 But, if Davis had been a suspect, he would not have had 
such a privacy interest, making the extraction lawful.
274
 Despite this 
precedent, the court held that even if the officers knew that Davis was 
a victim, the extraction of the DNA based on a misreading of the 
relevant precedent would be permissible and in good faith under 
Davis, making the exclusionary rule inapplicable.
275
  
 The court reached this holding even though it candidly and 
repeatedly recognized that the law surrounding individuals’ privacy in 
their DNA was unsettled.
276
 So, Davis DNA represents at least one 
court that has held that, even if binding precedent does not actually 
authorize a police practice at the time it is carried out, but officers 
mistakenly think that it does, Davis’ good faith exception may still 
apply. 
 Justice Breyer’s foresaw this exact issue in his dissent in 
Davis, and warned of the dangers of such holdings: 
 
[A]n officer who conducts a search that he believes 
complies with the Constitution but which, it ultimately 
turns out, falls just outside the Fourth Amendment’s 
bounds is no more culpable than an officer who follows 
erroneous “binding precedent.” Nor is an officer more 
culpable where circuit precedent is simply suggestive 
rather than “binding,” where it only describes how to 
treat roughly analogous instances, or where it just does 
not exist. Thus, if the Court means what it now says, if 
it would place determinative weight upon the 
culpability of an individual officer’s conduct, and if it 
would apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth 
Amendment violation was “deliberate, reckless, or 
                                                 
273
 Davis DNA, 690 F.3d at 244. 
274
 Id.  
275
 Id. at 254. 
276
 Id. at 240, 246. 
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grossly negligent,” then the “good faith” exception will 




Given the remarkable breadth of some courts’ applications of Davis’ 
new rule, and the lack of any concrete limiting principle for declining 
to apply Davis’ good faith exception, Justice Breyer’s prediction that 
the exclusionary rule will be swallowed may very likely come true if 
courts do not begin interpreting the rule more narrowly. 
 
ii. Is the Law Authorizing the Police’s Conduct Settled? 
 
 Some defendants have argued that the police should not be able 
to act in good faith reliance on binding precedent if that precedent is 
currently being challenged in a court of review.
278
 In Barraza-
Maldonado, Barraza-Maldonado argued that the DEA could not have 
acted in good faith reliance on any precedent
279
 when they installed a 
GPS monitoring device onto his car, because at the time of the 
installation (December 21st, 2011)
280
 the constitutionality of this 
practice was being challenged and was pending in the Supreme 
Court.
281
 However, the court rejected this argument, and held that the 
fact that the officers may have known the legality of their conduct may 
soon become unlawful was irrelevant.
282
 
 A similar argument was also rejected in United States v. Davis 
(“Davis Dog”).
283
 In that case, on December 12th, 2012, the police 
used a drug-sniffing dog to sniff the front door of Davis’ apartment 
                                                 
277
 Davis v United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
278
 United States v. Davis (“Davis Dog”), 760 F.3d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 2013). 
279
 See United States v. Pinedo-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
280
 Brief and Addendum of the Appellant at 3, United States v. Barraza-
Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3903). 
281
 Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d at 869. The Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in United States v. Jones on November 11th, 2011, roughly five weeks 
before the agents attached the device to Barraza-Maldonado’s car. 
282
 Id. at 869. 
283
 760 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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 Davis argued that one reason the officers could 
not have been acting in good faith on any precedent when using the 
dog was because, as in Barraza-Maldonado, the legality of such a 
practice was currently pending in the Supreme Court.
285
 However, 
again the court held that this fact was irrelevant.
286
    
 A related question has been the relevance of the timing of an 
officer’s actions after a decision has been announced holding a 
specific practice unconstitutional. For example, in State v. Fierro, the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota held that an officer could not rely on 
precedent to authorize his conduct when that precedent had been 
overruled by the State Supreme Court four months earlier.
287
 
However, if negligent police mistakes are permissible under Davis, a 
situation could arise in which reliance on precedent that had been 
overruled could be determined to be in good faith. Would an officer be 
more than negligent if the precedent he was relying on had been 
overruled just a few hours prior to his actions? One day? Two days? 
One week?  It is hard to define the precise moment in time when the 
officer’s conduct would turn from simple negligence to culpable 
negligence or recklessness that a court may aim to deter.   
 
3. Other Issues In Applying Davis 
 
i. The Actor Problem 
 
 Generally, the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary 
rule is only designed to deter police officers, and that the rule cannot 
be used to deter other actors who may be involved in the police’s 
                                                 
284
 Id. at 902.   
285
 Id. at 905. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Florida v. Jardines 
on October 31st, 2012, roughly six weeks before the agents used the dog to sniff 
Davis’ door.  
286
 760 F.3d at 905. See also State v. Edwards, 853 N.W.2d 246, 254 (S.D. 
2014) (holding that an officer was acting in good faith on binding precedent even 
though the legality of the practice he engaged in was pending before the Supreme 
Court in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)). 
287
 853 N.W.2d 235, 245 (S.D. 2014). 
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constitutional violations. For example, in Leon, the Court held that 
“the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather 
than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates [who issue 
warrants].”
288
 In Krull, the Court held that “legislators, like judicial 
officers, are not the focus of the rule,” and that the exclusionary rule 
should not be used to deter legislators unless they “ignore or subvert 
the Fourth Amendment,” because legislators are not adjuncts of law 
enforcement.
289
 In Evans, the Court noted that, “the exclusionary rule 
was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, 
not mistakes by court employees.”
290
 Further, the Court held that rule 
should not be used to try to deter court employees because, at least in 
the case at bar, there was no evidence that such employees were 
“inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment . . . .”
291
 Finally, 
in Davis, the Court also held that the exclusionary rule should not be 




 What the Court has not had occasion to rule on is whether the 
exclusionary rule can be invoked to deter prosecutors or other 
government lawyers who advise the police on the constitutionality of 
their conduct. However, the Court’s holding in Krull does suggest that 
the exclusionary rule could be used to deter prosecutors, because they 
are clearly adjuncts of law enforcement. After Davis was decided, this 
issue has arisen in a few federal appellate court decisions. 
 In Katzin, the court held that one of the reasons the officers had 
“an objectively reasonable good faith belief that their conduct was 
lawful,” was because before the officers installed a GPS device on the 
car in question they consulted with an Assistant United States 
Attorney (AUSA) about their proposed conduct.
293
 So, because the 
                                                 
288
 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). 
289
 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1987). 
290
 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995). 
291
 Id. at 14–15. 
292
 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011). 
293
 United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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AUSA approved the agents’ conduct
294
, this fact aided the court in 
holding the officers were acting in good faith.
295
 Katzin argued that 
application of the exclusionary rule would deter prosecutors from 
“engaging in overly aggressive readings of non-binding authority,” 
however the court never really addressed the significance of deterring 
prosecutors, suggesting that it found such deterrence irrelevant.
296
  
 However, the principal dissent sharply criticized the majority’s 
position. First, the dissent noted that the consultation with the AUSA 
was not a “panacea” for the constitutional issues raised, because the 
AUSA was not a neutral party (unlike a magistrate).
297
 Further, the 
dissent argued that the good faith exception should be limited to cases 
involving “nondeterrable” mistakes, or to cases where officers rely on 
a neutral third party.
298
 So, the dissent strongly suggested that the 
exclusionary rule could be used to deter officers from relying 
exclusively on advice from AUSAs, and that the exclusionary rule 
could even be used to deter the AUSAs themselves.
299
 
 In Brown, the Seventh Circuit took a similar position to the 
principal dissent in Katzin, and did suggest that the exclusionary could 
be used to deter lawyers advising federal or state law enforcement 
officers.
300
 However, this suggestion was a very minor part of the 
court’s overall opinion. 
 So, Katzin has suggested that the exclusionary rule should not 
be used to try to deter prosecutors from aggressive readings of 
authority, and that the fact that police rely on a prosecutor’s advice can 
be a factor suggesting the officer was acting in good faith. However, 
Brown has suggested the opposite.   
                                                 
294
See id. at 168. It was the Department of Justice’s policy that warrants were 
not required to install GPS devices on cars parked in public streets and survey the car 
on public roads. 
295
 Id. at 181. 
296
 See id. at 185–87.  
297
 Id. at 187.  
298
 Id. at 189–90.   
299
 Id. at 191. 
300
 United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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ii. Courts Have Assumed Fourth Amendment Issues Without Deciding 
Them 
 
 A very large number of courts have declined to actually discuss 
or reach a holding about whether a Fourth Amendment violation 
occurred, and instead have assumed without deciding that there was a 
Fourth Amendment violation (or accepted the government’s 
concession that violation occurred) in order to reach a good faith 
analysis.
301
 This is important because, when courts do this, they fail to 
set meaningful precedent about what is and what is not constitutional.  
 
iii. Courts are Interpreting Davis Very Broadly 
 
 Overall courts are interpreting Davis’ rule incredibly broadly, 
and not giving much consideration to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
that the law must be settled in order for the police to reasonably rely 
on it.
302
 For example, although Davis’ exception has been raised in a 
variety of different circumstances, and some cases are easier to decide 
that others, only one federal court of appeal
303
 and six state courts of 
review
304
 to consider Davis’ good faith exception have held that 
officers were not in fact acting in good faith on binding precedent. 
                                                 
301
 United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013); Katzin, 769 F.3d at 
170; United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 
834 (5th Cir. 2013); Brown, 744 F.3d at 476; United States v. Davis (“Davis Dog”), 
760 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1093 
(9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 
2012); Kelly v. State, 82 A.3d 205, 214 (Md. 2013). 
302
 See, e.g., United States v. Davis (“Davis DNA”), 690 F.3d 226, 240, 246 
(4th Cir. 2012).  
303
 See United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2013).   
304
 State v. Mitchell, 323 P.3d 69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Smallwood v. State, 
113 So.3d 724 (Fl. 2013); People v. LeFlore, 996 N.E.2d 678, 691 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2013); State v. Thomas, 334 P.3d 941, 945 (Okla. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Adams, 
763 S.E.2d 341 (S.C. 2014); State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 244 (S.D. 2014). 
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Conversely, seventeen federal courts of appeal
305
 and thirteen state 
courts of review
306
 have held that officers were acting in good faith on 
binding precedent. 
 
E. The Best Path Forward in Applying Davis 
 
 The exclusionary rule began as a device to give effect to the 
Fourth Amendment, and make citizens more secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects.
307
 By limiting the government’s incentive 
to violate individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights, and by significantly 
weakening its ability to convict individuals of crimes subsequent to 
such violations, the exclusionary has served as an incredibly important 
limit on government power.   
 The best path forward in applying Davis’ binding precedent 
exception is consistent with the exclusionary rule’s origins and 
purpose, and colored by a deep respect for the rule’s survival as a limit 
on the government’s power to search and seize in the future. The best 
path forward thus limits officers’ ability to rely on precedent, and also 
limits result-oriented courts from interpreting Davis however they 
                                                 
305
 United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2014); Sparks, 711 F.3d 58; 
United States v. Aguilar, 737 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2013); Katzin, 769 F.3d 163; 
Stephens, 764 F.3d 327; United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2013); Davis, 
690 F.3d 226; Andres, 703 F.3d 828; United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 
2014); Brown, 744 F.3d 474; Davis, 760 F.3d 901; United States v. Barraza-
Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013); Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086; Pinedo-Moreno, 
688 F.3d 1087; United States v. Madden, 682 F.3d 920 (10th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Soza, 643 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 
914 (11th Cir. 2014).  
306
 People v. Hopper, 284 P.3d 87 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011); Henderson v. State, 
953 N.E.2d 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Carlton, 304 P.3d 323 (Kan. 2013); 
Parker v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381 (Ky. 2014); Briscoe v. State, 30 A.3d 
870 (Md. 2011); Kelly v. State, 82 A.3d 205 (Md. 2013); People v. Mungo, 813 
N.W.2d 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627 (Mo. 2011); 
State v. Hoffman, No. 2013–0688, 2014 WL 5648448 (Ohio 2014); State v. Brown, 
736 S.E.2d 263 (S.C. 2012); State v. Edwards, 853 N.W.2d 246 (S.D. 2014); Taylor 
v. State, 410 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App. 2013); State v. Oberst, 847 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2014). 
307
 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914). 
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wish, to reach whatever result they wish. The following hypothetical 
will be used throughout the discussion of the best path in order to 
illustrate its merits. 
 Over the last century, a common situation in which the Court 
has constantly been confronted with Fourth Amendment problems is 
when the police develop new technology to investigate crime.
308
 So, as 
a useful hypothetical, suppose that law enforcement agencies around 
the country develop, and begin to use, a new sophisticated device that 
allows them to remotely scan individuals, and indicate whether the 
individual has used illegal drugs within the last thirty days (much like 
a drug test). Now suppose the police use their new device, without a 
warrant, to scan Randy, a young man walking down the street in a bad 
neighborhood.  The scan is done without Randy’s knowledge, and the 
device informs the police that Randy has recently ingested cocaine, 
probably within the last seventy-two hours. So, the police conduct a 
Terry stop, things go downhill for Randy, and the police find drugs 
and a knife on his person after a lawful Terry pat-down.
309
   
 In his subsequent criminal trial, Randy argues that the police’s 
act of using the device constituted a Fourth Amendment search, and he 
asks the trial court to suppress the evidence because the search was 
unreasonable and the fruit of the officers’ initial unlawful use of the 
device. However, the government argues that the use of the device was 
not a search, that even if there was a search it was reasonable, and that 
no matter how the first two issues are resolved the evidence should not 
be suppressed because, pursuant to Davis, the police were acting in 
good faith on binding precedent when using the device. The trial court 
could determine that the police’s use of the device was not a search, 
but for our purposes the court does not do so and proceeds to consider 
the government’s good faith argument under Davis.
310
 
                                                 
308
 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 
(1928). 
309
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
310
 The court could also choose not to address the merits of whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred, and only conduct a good faith analysis, as some 
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 1. How Binding Precedent Should Be Defined 
 
 The question of what exactly should constitute precedent is a 
tricky one. For example, the court in Randy’s case, regardless of what 
universe of cases it decides is binding and what those cases hold, can 
use Davis’ holding to do whatever it wishes. If the court desires to 
reach a certain result, instead of trying to objectively apply the law, 
whatever result the court desires can be readily reached through 
various interpretive techniques. All lawyers know that precedent can 
be shaved down to a fine point, or flattened into a bludgeon, as long as 
the craftsman is skilled. For this portion of the discussion, it also does 
not matter whether Randy is tried in federal or state court. 
 If the court wants to admit the evidence and hold that the 
officers were acting in good faith, it could find some precedent from 
its own jurisdiction or from the United States Supreme Court, and hold 
that the precedent authorized the police to use their device. For 
example, the court could use Kyllo, and hold that because the device 
was available to the public for general use, the police acted in good 
faith belief they were not conducting a Fourth Amendment search.
311
   
 If no reasonable argument could be made that the device was 
available for public use (meaning the court would lose legitimacy if it 
held to the contrary), or if the court did not want to use Kyllo for 
whatever reason, it could instead look at the general legal landscape 
around the country, as some courts have done.
312
 After this review, the 
court would find some cases holding that individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in concealing contraband, and thus a 
police practice that only reveals the presence or absence of contraband 
is not a search.
313
 Of course, given Jones, the court would also have to 
hold that the government had not physically trespassed into Randy’s 
body, but this would be a reasonable argument to make.  
                                                                                                                   
courts have done.  See United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013);. 
Katzin, 769 F.3d at170; United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
311
 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
312
 See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 177–82; Stephens, 764 F.3d at 338. 
313
 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005). 
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 Simply put, if the court wanted to admit the evidence, it could 
either: (1) choose a case from its own jurisdiction and hold that it 
authorized the police to use the device, or (2) if no such useful case 
were available, expand the universe of binding cases until it found a 
case sufficiently similar to Randy’s that authorized the officers’ 
conduct. There is no doubt one will almost always exist somewhere, 
so long as courts are willing to look hard. 
 If the court wants to exclude the evidence, it could also easily 
do so, and again it is totally irrelevant what cases actually exist 
throughout the country. For example, the court could hold that the 
officers should have known the device was not widely available for 
public use under Kyllo, and thus that using the device would be a 
search. And again, if this is an unsavory statement to make and one the 
court wants to avoid, the court could (again quite reasonably) hold that 
the officers should have known that the device was much like a 
government trespass into Randy’s body, and thus would be a search. 
Even if there was binding precedent within the court’s jurisdiction that 
appeared to directly authorize the police’s use of the device, the court 
could look to the legal landscape around the country, but this time 
look for cases that would indicate the use of such devices was 
unsettled. For example, even if no case in the country had addressed 
the use of the remote drug-testing device, the court could find a case 
holding that a suspicionless drug test of an individual constituted a 
search absent some special need.
314
 Then, the court stress the 
importance of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, and hold that because 
the legality of the device was not clearly settled, the police could not 
have acted in good faith.
315
 
 Now, change the facts of the hypothetical slightly, and imagine 
the law enforcement officers using the device are agents with the 
DEA. Now, the agents are in East St. Louis in Illinois, very close to 
                                                 
314
 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997). 
315
 Another way to think about this kind of hypothetical is to consider, if the 
case of Kyllo arose “for the first time today rather than in 2001,” whether the 
evidence unconstitutionally seized would be admissible under Davis. JOSHUA 
DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVESTIGATING CRIME 
527 (West, 5th ed. 2013). 
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the border between Illinois and Missouri. Randy the unfortunate is still 
in his bad neighborhood, but now he is in St. Louis, Missouri. What 
precedents may the agents now rely on? The Seventh Circuit’s? The 
Eighth Circuit’s? Illinois state law? Missouri state law?  
 The answer again is largely irrelevant, because if a court wants 
to admit the evidence, the only thing that will stand in its way is if all 
the jurisdictions have cases directly on point clearly prohibiting the 
use of the device. As long as one jurisdiction allows it, a court could 
hold that that jurisdiction alone enabled the agents to act in good faith. 
One out of four might be a hard sell, but the court’s holding could be 
bolstered by concluding that the jurisdiction’s precedent that 
authorized the conduct was the only jurisdiction that mattered.
316
  
 For example, the court that the agents’ conduct suggests that 
the government intended to prosecute Randy in the jurisdiction that 
allowed the use of the device, and it should not matter if plans changed 
after the contraband was found. Or, to getter better odds (one out of 
two), the court could hold that all that mattered was where Randy was 
(Missouri or the Eighth Circuit), or all that mattered was where the 
agents were (Illinois or the Seventh Circuit).   
 And again, if the court wished to keep the evidence out, it 
could go through similar interpretive hurdles, holding that the choice 
precedent provided an unsettled landscape rather than judicial 
authorization. The only thing standing in its way would be if all four 
jurisdictions had cases on point clearly authorizing the practice.   
 “Binding precedent” is a nebulous concept. In this nebula, law 
enforcement officers and courts alike are free to maneuver without 
limitation and pursue any subjective goal they wish, without much 
regard to how the Fourth Amendment protects all people. Given this 
reality, binding precedent should be defined narrowly, in order to 
accomplish two important goals: (1) providing clarity, and (2) 
providing limitations.  
 Therefore, “binding precedent” should be defined for both state 
and federal law enforcement officers as the decisions of the state and 
                                                 
316
 See, e.g., United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 
2013). 
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federal circuit in which they are acting, and the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. When federal and state law conflicts, this 
should be a factor suggesting the officers could not have relied in good 
faith on either jurisdictions’ precedent (due to its unsettled nature).   
 This rule should also hold true if federal officers’ conduct 
extends over many jurisdictions. In these situations, precedential 
universe expands, but the limiting principle remains with equal if not 
greater force, because any conflicts that arise are still a factor 
suggesting the officers could not have relied in good faith on any 
jurisdictions’ precedent, again due to its unsettled nature. In these 
circumstances, agents must strictly comply with all jurisdictions’ 
precedents in which they may act, and if they fail to do this courts 
should lean towards holding the officers did not act in good faith. This 
would go along way to solve the multi-jurisdictional issues discussed 
above. 
 Good officers should be trained on what the law allows,
317
 but 
this will be incredibly hard if “binding precedent” is not defined 
clearly and narrowly. Officers should not be tasked with knowing how 
the Fourth Amendment is being interpreted in fifty different states and 
twelve different federal circuits. Further, limiting the definition of 
binding precedent will prevent overly aggressive police officers from 
unnecessarily risking violations of people’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
If officers feel that courts will support their actions by looking around 
the entire country for precedent to authorize their conduct after the 
fact, such risks may be taken more frequently without the officers 
seeking a warrant from an independent judicial officer. 
  Courts of review should also be interested in limiting 
themselves, and lower courts over which they sit. Limiting what 
constitutes precedent as described above will restrict (although not 
stop entirely) lower courts using whatever interpretive tools they wish 
to reach any result they wish. This limitation would also provide more 
clear guidance for judges trying to objectively apply the law without 
regard for what result is reached. And, by doing so, such a rule would 
                                                 
 
317
 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (holding that 
officers should have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits). 
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provide more consistent results, as opposed to the incredibly varied 
results that courts have thus far reached. 
  
2. Defining the Limits of Officers’ Good Faith Reliance on Binding 
Precedent 
 
 This question is complicated, because it is hard to precisely 
apply Davis’ culpability rubric when dealing with officers’ reliance on 
precedent. For example, under the Court’s current regime, an officer 
will not be culpable if he acts with isolated or simple negligent 
reliance on precedent.
318
 But, the officer will be culpable if his 
reliance on precedent was grossly negligent or reckless.
319
 The line 
between these two standards of culpability is obviously a very hard to 
draw. 
 Because of this difficulty, and because of the variety of 
different contexts in which past precedent can guide officers’ present 
conduct, no fixed line can ever be drawn. Instead a variety of different 
tests for each conceptual problem raised needs to be considered. 
 
i. Binding Precedent Must Be Very Similar to the Present Case Under 
Review 
 
 The best approach to use when determining how similar 
precedent must be to a present case under review is to hold that, 
consistent with Davis, the precedent must “specifically authorize” the 
officers’ conduct in order for officers to be able to rely in good faith 
on that precedent.  
 To determine whether precedent specifically authorizes the 
officers’ current conduct, courts should examine two factors: (1) 
whether the facts of the old case are similar to the present case, and (2) 
whether the underlying rationales used to decide the old case could 
have led the officers to think their present conduct was constitutional. 
For example, Davis held that Belton “specifically authorized” the 
                                                 
318




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 10, Issue 1                            Fall 2014 
 
220 
police’s search of Davis’ car, because the conduct at issue in both 
cases was incredibly similar (searches of cars incident to the arrest of a 
recent occupant). And, Belton’s underlying rationale, that police 
officers could always conduct such searches regardless of whether the 
arrestee was in reaching distance of the vehicle due of the need for 
officer safety and clear guidelines in that specific context also applied 
with full force to the search of Davis’ car. 
 However, if this two-part test does not indicate that the old 
precedent specifically authorized the officers’ current conduct, this 
should constitute a per se bar to a finding of good faith, and the 
inquiry can end. This will stop courts from completely eroding the 
exclusionary rule over time. If officers can be held to be acting in good 
faith even when the past precedent does not specifically authorize their 
conduct, no limiting principle to application of Davis’ holding will 
exist and the exclusionary rule will disappear.
320
  
 Applying this test to our hypothetical with Randy above would 
almost certainly lead to the conclusion that the officers were not in fact 
acting in good faith on any precedent when using their device. First, 
unlike in Davis where the officers could have relied on Belton to 
specifically authorize their conduct, in our hypothetical no such 
precedent would lead the officers to believe that their conduct was not 
a search (unless other binding precedent had already resolved that 
nearly identical conduct was not a search). So, the good faith inquiry 
could end there.  
 However, if a court holds that precedent does specifically 
authorize the police’s conduct, such a court should proceed to the next 
step in the analysis, which is determining whether or not the 
constitutionality of the practice is settled. 
  
ii. The Law Authorizing the Police’s Conduct Must be Settled 
 
 As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in Davis, courts 
should consider whether the law authorizing a practice is settled, 
because a situation where the law is unsettled is a very different 
                                                 
320
 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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situation than one where the law is clearly settled, as was the case in 
Davis.
321
 The difference is of course that when the law is unsettled, 
officers should be much less certain that their conduct is authorized, 
and courts in these circumstances should not find that the officers 
acted in good faith. 
 To determine whether the law is settled, courts should only 
look at binding precedent (defined above as the law of the relevant 
federal circuit and state). This is because it would be unfair to ask 
officers to only look to binding precedent for guidance regarding the 
constitutionality of their actions, but allow courts to look outside this 
sphere to determine whether the law was settled.  
 Although determining when the law is “settled” may be 
difficult in some circumstances, courts should consider this factor with 
an eye towards always holding that the underlying law is unsettled 
absent a high degree of clarity. For example, if a state Supreme Court 
was reviewing the constitutionality of a practice about which lower 
courts had disagreed, this should strongly suggest that the law was 
unsettled, regardless of the weight of authority on each side of the 
split. 
 Also, the fact that a particular practice is being challenged in a 
court of review is important in determining whether the law is settled. 
For this inquiry, the court hearing the challenge to a police practice 
will be relevant. For example, an appellate court’s decision may only 
call into question the constitutionality of a police practice, while a 
Supreme Court (either state or federal) has a greater ability and 
likelihood to definitively settle the constitutionality of a practice. 
Further, the fact that a court where a defendant has an appeal of right 
has taken the case would have less significance than the fact that a 
court which only grants such defendants permissive appeals has taken 
the case. This is because, when a court which grants permissive 
appeals such as a state Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
Court takes a case, the courts are making a deliberate decision to 
consider the constitutionality of a particular practice. Such a decision 
                                                 
321
 Id. at 2434–35 (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 
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should put officers on notice that their conduct may be 
unconstitutional. 
 Although some courts have held that the fact that a practice is 
being challenged does not matter,
322
 the Court in Leon held that 
officers should be tasked with having a reasonable understanding of 
what the law is. Knowing what the law is involves knowing when a 
practice is authorized and the law authorizing it is settled, and when 
the law concerning the practice is unsettled and under review. The fact 
that a practice is being challenged is certainly not dispositive in the 
good faith analysis, but it should be a factor courts consider.  
   
3. Resolving Other Issues Raised By Davis 
 
i. The Actor Problem 
 
 The exclusionary rule should be used to deter prosecutors, 
especially when the government seeks to justify the officers’ good 
faith on the fact that the officers consulted with a prosecutor. Because 
prosecutors are “adjuncts to the law enforcement team,”
323
 courts 
applying Davis should use the exclusionary rule to deter prosecutors 
from over-aggressive advising of officers. However, courts should not 
hold prosecutors to a higher burden of knowing the law in these 
circumstances, and be quicker to find bad faith, because such a rule 
would act as a disincentive for police officers from seeking advice on 
the law from government lawyers. 
 
ii. Courts should not Assume Fourth Amendment Issues Without 
Deciding Them 
 
 One final issue is that courts should not avoid deciding the 
merits of a case simply because the court has determined that the 
                                                 
322
 See United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 2014); United States 
v. Barraza-Maldanado, 732 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 2013). 
323
 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1987). 
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officers were acting in good faith.
324
 Instead of leaping to a good faith 
analysis, courts must first analyze whether the underlying conduct is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Doing this will set new 
precedent about the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment, and provide 
guidance to law enforcement in the future. 
 If all courts from 2015 onwards begin refusing to decide the 
merits of cases, and instead simply decide whether officers were 
acting in good faith on previous precedent, our common law system 
would largely end in the Fourth Amendment context. When law 
enforcement develops new technology in the future, courts would 
forever be deprived of the ability to make reasoned holdings based on 
what the Fourth Amendment requires, because as time moves on less 
and less precedent will be available to them. Instead, courts will have 
to decide, based on cases resolving the constitutionality of conduct 
decided before 2015, whether or not the officers were acting in good 
faith that their conduct was reasonable, not whether in fact the conduct 
was reasonable. There may seem to be little distinction between these 
choices now, but in one hundred years the problem will be more 
severe.  
 To avoid this problem, courts must make holdings regarding 
the constitutionality of officers’ conduct before deciding if the officers 
were acting in good faith on binding precedent. 
 
E. How the Seventh Circuit Went Astray In Gutierrez 
 
 In Gutierrez, the Seventh Circuit erred in both the analytical 
tools it chose use in applying Davis, and the results it reached in using 
the tools it choose. 
 
                                                 
324
 See United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 
327, 334 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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1. The Court Failed to Adopt the Best Interpretation of Binding 
Precedent  
 
 Before Gutierrez was decided, a split existed within the 
Seventh Circuit as to what constituted binding precedent under Davis.  
In Martin, the court rejected the government’s argument that the 
police should be able to rely in good faith on “the weight of authority 
around the country,”
325
 while in Brown the court strongly suggested 
that officers may rely on decisions from other federal circuits because 
not allowing police to do so would not yield much deterrence.
326
  
 Gutierrez failed to resolve this split, and the court also failed to 
adopt the best interpretation possible of what constitutes binding 
precedent. Although the court held that officers could have relied on 
one of the Seventh Circuit’s previous cases, United States v. Brock,
327
 
the court failed to address an important case decided by Indiana Court 
of Appeals, Hoop v. State.
328
 And, Hoop had been addressed at length 
by the district court,
329
 and in the parties’ briefs to the Seventh 
Circuit.
330
 So, the court should have taken the opportunity, given the 
existence of Hoop, to weigh in on the split in the Seventh Circuit over 
what constitutes binding precedent. Given the best definition discussed 
above, the court should have evaluated Hoop in conjunction with 
Brock as binding precedent.   
 The court probably choose not to address Hoop because doing 
so would have raised two difficult questions: (1) whether federal 
officers can rely on state cases to authorize their conduct, and (2) 
whether those state cases may also limit the bounds of federal officers’ 
                                                 
325
 United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014). 
326
 United States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2013). 
327
 417 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2005). 
328
 Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
329
 United States v. Cota, 2013 WL 4510163 at *4 (N.D. Ind. 2013). 
330
 Brief and Required Short Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 10, United 
States v. Gutierrez, 760 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1159); Brief of the 
Plaintiff-Appellee, United States of America at 18–19, Gutierrez, 760 F.3d (No. 14-
1159); Reply Brief of Defendant Appellant at 1–2, Gutierrez, 760 F.3d (No. 14-
1159). 
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good faith that their conduct was lawful. Although questions along 
these lines arose at oral argument,
331
 the court did not give any answer 
in its opinion. So overall, the court’s analysis of what constitutes 
binding precedent was very unsatisfactory.   
 
2. Good Faith Issues 
 
 Gutierrez’s treatment of the good faith inquiry was also 
unsatisfactory. First, the court failed to enunciate a clear standard 
regarding how similar binding precedent must be to the present case 
under review in order for officers to be able to rely in good faith on 
that precedent. Second, the court failed to address the question of 
whether the precedent the officers relied on was settled, which is 
important because the legality of the officers’ conduct in Gutierrez 
was very unsettled. Third, the court failed to address the significance 
of the officers’ reliance on the advice they received from a State 
prosecutor.  
 In terms of whether previous precedent specifically authorized 
the officers’ conduct, the court failed to enunciate a clear standard by 
which to evaluate cases. The court, on two occasions, cited Davis’ 
holding that the evidence should not be suppressed if precedent 
specifically authorized the officers’ conduct.
332
 However, on each 
occasion, the court then almost immediately afterward held that the 
evidence should not be suppressed if precedent authorized the officers’ 
conduct.
333
 So, it appears the court did not follow Davis’ suggestion 
that precedential authorization of police conduct must be specific, but 
the court did not explicitly state why it choose authorization instead of 
specific authorization, or whether it was choosing to use this slightly 
different language deliberately. 
                                                 
331
 Oral Argument, Gutierrez, 760 F.3d (Case No. 14-1159), available at 
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/ab.14-1159.14-1159_06_02_2014.mp3 
(last visited Jan. 15th, 2015). 
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 Further, the court erred in holding that past precedent was in 
fact similar enough to the case at bar to authorize the officers’ 
conduct. As an initial matter the court should have considered Hoop as 
part of the binding precedent universe. Hoop provides that under the 
Indiana State constitution, law enforcement officers must have 
reasonable suspicion before conducting a dog-sniff of a private 
residence.
334
 And, Hoop expressly declined to state whether an 
anonymous tip, like the officers had in Gutierrez, would be enough to 
supply this reasonable suspicion.
335
 So, under Hoop, the officers’ 
conduct was not clearly authorized. 
 However, even if Hoop is put aside and only Brock is 
considered, the court still erred in holding that the officers could have 
relied in good faith on Brock at the time they used Fletch to examine 
Gutierrez’s front door. Essentially, Brock held that law enforcement 
officers do not commit a Fourth Amendment search, and thus do not 
need a warrant, to use a drug-sniffing dog to smell a home so long as 
the officers are lawfully present where the sniff is conducted. So, the 
key question for the court in Gutierrez was whether the police were 
lawfully present at Gutierrez’s front door when they used Fletch. 
 Gutierrez correctly argued that, under Jones, the lawfulness of 
the officers’ presence at his front door was unclear. Jones held that in 
addition to Katz’s privacy test, the common law trespass test should be 
used to determine when a Fourth Amendment search occurs.
336
 So, if 
the officers committed a trespass in searching for evidence at 
Gutierrez’s front door, Jones held that such a trespass is relevant for 
Fourth Amendment purposes and would thus ordinarily render 
officers’ conduct unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment if 
such a trespass were done without a warrant.  
 The court in Gutierrez held that there was no trespass, because 
under the Court’s decision in Kentucky v. King,
337
 the police are 
allowed to approach a homeowner’s front door and knock on it 
                                                 
334




 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 756. 
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because in doing so, the police do no more than the ordinary citizen.
338
 
However, the officers in Gutierrez did more than an ordinary citizen 
would do because they approached the home with a drug-sniffing dog. 
And, this is exactly why the Court in Florida v. Jardines held that 
such conduct is a search; officers who approach a home with a drug-
sniffing dog exceed their implied license to enter a person’s 
property.
339
 The court in Gutierrez recognized that the officers may 
not have been lawfully present if they “lingered” at Gutierrez’s front 
door before using the dog (because such conduct also exceeds 
individuals’ implied license to approach a home and knock on the 
door),
340
 but the court failed to explain why the officers’ approach of 
the home with Fletch would not also exceed their implied license, 
rendering their presence in front of Gutierrez’s door unlawful and their 
subsequent actions unauthorized under Brock.   
 So, at the time of the officers’ conduct in Gutierrez, Brock’s 
validity had been significantly called into question by Jones, and 
Brock could not have provided sufficient authorization for the officers’ 
conduct because the question of whether the officers were lawfully 
present in front of Gutierrez’s front door was incredibly unclear.   
 The court also improperly characterized this portion of its 
analysis as whether or not Jones had “overruled” Brock, and whether 
Brock was still good law.
341
 But, this was an incorrect approach. The 
more accurate question pursuant to Davis is, given binding precedent, 
could the officers have relied on good faith that Brock authorized their 
conduct. Given Jones and King, it was incredibly unclear whether 
Brock still provided such authorization, regardless of whether or not 
Brock had been formally overruled in its entirety. 
 The court also failed to discuss the importance of Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Davis, and hold that the law regarding the 
constitutionality of a police practice must be settled in order for 
officers to rely in good faith that their conduct is authorized. This is 
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 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 756. 
339
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013). 
340
 Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 758. 
341
 Id. at 756. 
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important because again, Jones and King seriously called into question 
the validity of using drug dogs to sniff individuals’ houses. Related to 
this, the court also failed to discuss the relevance of the fact that the 
law enforcement’s practice of using a drug-sniffing dog to smell the 
outside of a person’s home was being challenged in the Supreme 
Court when the officers used Fletch to examine Gutierrez’s door.
342
 As 
discussed above, this consideration is important, because it suggests 
that the conduct being reviewed may not in fact be constitutional.   
 The court also failed to discuss the relevance of the officers’ 
consultation with a State prosecutor regarding the legality of their 
conduct. Although the prosecutor’s advice came after the police had 
used Fletch, it did come before the police entered the home and 
discovered evidence. So, the court should have held that the 
exclusionary rule should have been used to deter future prosecutors 
from giving erroneous advice. The prosecutor should have been aware 
that under Hoop, the officers needed reasonable suspicion to use the 
dog sniff, and that the law was unclear whether the officers’ 
anonymous tip would have been sufficient to provide such reasonable 
suspicion. 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
 The exclusionary rule was created to be a very important and 
integral part of the Fourth Amendment’s limit on the government’s 
power. Courts need to interpret Davis’ rule narrowly in order to limit 
government’s power and enable citizens to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects. So far, courts around the country, 
including the Seventh Circuit, have been failing to properly interpret 
Davis, and the result if continued may be the total erosion of the 
exclusionary rule.   
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